

**LEVERAGING QUANTUM COMPUTING FOR ENHANCED
CYBERSECURITY:
A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD FOR CYBERSECURITY AND DATA
PROTECTION**

by

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ABSTRACT

Quantum computing revolutionizes cybersecurity as both a potent defensive shield and an existential offensive threat to India's digital sovereignty, imperilling Aadhaar, UPI, Digital India, and critical information infrastructure reliant on classical encryption. This analysis scrutinises its double-edged impact on national data-protection architectures, underscoring the urgency of proactive cryptographic migration under the National Quantum Mission amid accelerating quantum capabilities. Through systematic examination of technological vulnerabilities and regulatory imperatives, the inquiry integrates quantum threat modelling with doctrinal scrutiny of Indian legal precedents to forecast systemic risks and mitigation pathways. Central to the evaluation is a hybrid methodology combining algorithmic deconstruction of Shor's Algorithm—capable of factoring large integers in polynomial time, thereby nullifying RSA and ECC protocols—with doctrinal analysis of landmark authorities, including *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India ((2017) 10 SCC 1; Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012)*, which elevated privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 and mandated robust safeguards now enforced by the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) with penalties up to ₹250 crore for security lapses, alongside the Task Force Report on Implementation of Quantum Safe Ecosystem in India (DST, February 2026) directing PQC migration for Critical Information Infrastructure by 2029 to neutralise HNDL

risks. Supplementary insights derive from IT Act, 2000 frameworks on encryption interception. Findings affirm QKD's unconditional security for key exchange yet highlight pervasive retroactive decryption exposure, with lattice-based PQC demonstrating superior resistance under Grover's speed-up constraints. Implications necessitate immediate cryptographic agility frameworks, elevated corporate liability under DPDP for quantum unpreparedness, and harmonised national standards to safeguard data sovereignty, avert catastrophic breaches in India's digital economy, and harness quantum-enhanced defences for resilient infrastructures.

Keywords: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), Shor's Algorithm, Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HN DL) Attacks, Cryptographic Agility, Quantum-Resistant Lattice-Based Protocols

I. The Quantum Double-Edged Sword – Forging Cybersecurity Supremacy Amid Cryptographic Disruption in India's Sovereign Digital Frontier: An Introduction

In Cybersecurity, Quantum Computing is a paradigm-shifting turning point that simultaneously increases defensive capabilities through Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Quantum-Resistant Cryptography and poses an existential threat to the traditional encryption protocols that support India's digital economy. The dual-edged nature of using quantum technology for improved cybersecurity and data protection in the Indian setting is outlined, which places it in the context of national policy imperatives, regulatory frameworks, and judicial precedents. The interaction between quantum potential and dangers as India moves toward a \$5 trillion digital economy necessitates quick, proactive adaptation to protect vital infrastructure, private information, and national security¹.

a. Quantum Computing: The Dual Nexus of Opportunity and Peril in Cybersecurity

Quantum computing relies on superposition, entanglement, and interference to do computations that are not feasible with traditional systems. On the offensive side, methods such as Shor's enable efficient factorization of large primes, rendering RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) obsolete, while Grover's approach quadratically accelerates brute-force attacks on symmetric ciphers. This makes it easier for adversaries to conduct "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HN DL) assaults, in which they store encrypted material now for future quantum decryption. These attacks are especially dangerous for assets with a lengthy shelf life, such as bank information, defense secrets, and medical data. On the other hand, defensive advances are made possible by quantum mechanics: QKD offers information-theoretic security for key exchange that is impervious to eavesdropping, and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards, such as hash-based or lattice-based algorithms, guarantee robustness. This

dichotomy shows up in India as a potential vulnerability to state-sponsored or non-state actors using quantum supremacy, as well as a strategic advantage for strengthening cyber defenses². The global significance of this technological inflection point received formal international recognition when the United Nations General Assembly, by Resolution A/RES/78/287 of 7 June 2024, proclaimed 2025 as the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology, under the leadership of UNESCO, with over 70 co-sponsoring nations. This proclamation underscores the cross-border nature of quantum risk: encrypted data harvested from Indian Aadhaar-linked systems, UPI transaction records, or defence communications today may be stored by adversarial state actors for decryption once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer becomes available, a threat horizon that several credible technical assessments now place as early as 2029 to 2032. India's proactive National Quantum Mission, in this context, represents not merely a domestic research investment but a constitutional imperative to safeguard the informational privacy rights recognised in Puttaswamy.¹

b. India's Strategic Quantum Leap: National Quantum Mission and Indigenous Capabilities

India has responded with a strong policy framework. Quantum Computing at IISc Bengaluru, Quantum Communication at IIT Madras-C-DOT, Quantum Sensing at IIT Bombay, and Quantum Materials at IIT Delhi are the four thematic hubs of the National Quantum Mission (NQM), which was approved by the Union Cabinet in April 2023 with a ₹6,003.65 crore outlay (2023–2031). The NQM is a hub-spoke-spike model that spans 43 institutions. Satellite-based secure quantum communications, intercity QKD over 2,000 km, and an indigenous 1,000-qubit quantum computer by 2030–31 are among the goals². The Indian Army's Quantum Computing Lab (supported by NSCS), ISRO-RRI's satellite-to-mobile QKD demonstration (2023), DRDO-IIT Delhi's 100 km QKD connection (2022), and the operational quantum communication network (2023) that challenges ethical hackers are examples of complementary endeavours. A national Quantum Safe Ecosystem strategy is outlined in a February 2026 NQM Task Force study, which specifically addresses HNDL concerns by emphasizing PQC pilots, certification labs (aligned with ISO/IEC 19790), and gradual migration for vital sectors including banking, defense, and telecom³.

c. The Cryptographic Apocalypse: Quantum Threats to Indian Data Protection and Sovereignty

¹ United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/78/287, 'International Year of Quantum Science and Technology, 2025' (7 June 2024) <<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4052700>> accessed 15 September 2026.

The underlying presumptions of India's cybersecurity posture are at risk from unchecked quantum progress. Vulnerable RSA/ECC is used by public-key infrastructure to secure digital banking, Aadhaar-linked services, UPI, and vital infrastructure (power grids, railroads). Retrospective decryption of stored data is possible with a sufficiently developed quantum computer (some estimates place the number of logical qubits at over a million by the late 2020s). The DPDP Act, 2023, which was passed after Puttaswamy, requires "Reasonable Security Safeguards" (Section 8) and imposes fines of up to ₹250 crore for violations. However, it does not explicitly specify quantum resilience, which exposes data fiduciaries to future responsibility. Digital sovereignty threats are increased by cross-border data flows and "Harvest-Now" strategies⁴.

The economic stakes of quantum unpreparedness are already apparent in present-day breach costs that quantum-era decryption would exponentially magnify. According to the Reserve Bank of India's Currency and Finance Report for 2023-24, the average cost of a data breach in India reached USD 2.18 million in 2023, representing a 28 per cent increase since 2020; this figure remains below the global average of USD 4.88 million reported by IBM's Cost of a Data Breach Report 2024, but the gap is narrowing as India's digital economy deepens. When these breach costs are extrapolated to a post-quantum scenario where HNDL attacks allow adversaries to retroactively decrypt years of archived Aadhaar-linked financial records or health data, the aggregate liability exposure for data fiduciaries under Section 8 of the DPDP Act, 2023, and the consequent penalties of up to Rs 250 crore per breach, would dwarf any upfront investment in post-quantum cryptographic migration.²

d. Evolving Indian Legal and Regulatory Framework: Bridging Classical Gaps

The consent-centric, fiduciary obligations of the DPDP Act now encompass liability for Negligent Data Protection, which was previously imposed under Section 43A & Section 72A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. To legally include IT Act/CERT interoperability, crypto-agility requirements, and PQC standards Experts suggest a particular National Quantum Act in frames. The 2026 Quantum Safe Ecosystem study recommends PQC procurement guidelines, tiered testing facilities recognized by NABL, and hybrid QKD-PQC deployments for sovereign-grade systems. To meet worldwide NIST/ETSI PQC criteria, RBI and MeitY cybersecurity guidelines must incorporate quantum risk assessments⁵.

² IBM, 'Cost of a Data Breach Report 2024' (IBM Security, 2024); Reserve Bank of India, 'Currency and Finance Report 2023-24' (RBI, July 2024) <<https://www.rbi.org.in>> accessed 15 September 2026.

A further regulatory lever of direct relevance is the Telecommunications Act, 2023, which received Presidential assent on 24 December 2023 and, once fully notified, will replace the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. Under Section 19(f) read with Section 22 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023, the Central Government is empowered to prescribe standards and conformity assessment measures specifically in respect of cybersecurity for telecommunication services and networks, encryption, and data processing in telecommunications. This provision creates an express statutory basis for the Department of Telecommunications to mandate post-quantum encryption standards for telecom operators and OTT service providers, a power that, if exercised in alignment with the DST Task Force's PQC migration roadmap, would close one of the most critical legal gaps in India's quantum-resilience framework. The Telecommunications Act, 2023, therefore operates as a complementary instrument to the DPDP Act, 2023, and the IT Act, 2000, creating a layered statutory architecture through which quantum-safe standards can be progressively mandated across India's digital infrastructure.³

e. Judicial Precedents: Foundational Pillars for Quantum-Era Accountability

The normative foundation is provided by landmark jurisprudence. A nine-judge panel overruled M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh in *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) Vs. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1* by unanimously declaring privacy a fundamental right inherent to Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty), entwined with Articles 14 and 19. In quantum-era data breaches, when "Reasonable Safeguards" under DPDP would require PQC migration, the Court placed a strong emphasis on protecting informational privacy against unjustified governmental or private interference⁶.

In *State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Suhas Katti (Case No. 4680/2004)*, India's first conviction under Section 67 of the IT Act for obscene electronic postings, together with IPC Sections 469 and 509, was the first instance of cyber enforcement. It demonstrated the judiciary's readiness to strictly enforce new technology legislation. Precedents from consumer forums further highlight institutional liability: several decisions against Axis Bank (such as *Asim Choudhary Vs. Axis Bank, District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Case No. CC/144/CC/267/2023*; and similar cases imposing compensation for cybersecurity deficiencies and 2FA lapses under

³ Trilegal, 'The Telecommunications Act, 2023: A Step towards Digital India' (Trilegal, 29 December 2023)

<https://trilegal.com/knowledge_repository/the-telecommunications-act-2023-a-step-towards-digital-india/> accessed 15 September 2026; Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, 'The Indian Telecommunications Bill, 2023' (India Corporate Law Blog, 23 January 2024) <<https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2024/01/the-indian-telecommunications-bill-2023/>> accessed 15 September 2026.

pre-DPDP Section 43A principles) affirm banks' obligation to implement strong safeguards, hint at quantum-era accountability for not implementing PQC⁷.

In conclusion, quantum computing is a geopolitical and legal need rather than just a scientific advancement. With proactive PQC migration, legislative reinforcement, and privacy-centric adjudication, India's NQM and DPDP architecture positions it to use the "Sword" for improved cybersecurity while reducing the "Double-Edged" threats. In order to promote a comprehensive quantum-resilient ecosystem that protects constitutional privacy while safeguarding digital Bharat, this study goes on to analyse technical designs, policy gaps, and implementation roadmaps.

II. Quantum Algorithms as Existential Threat's: Shor's, Grover's, and Emerging Variants in Cryptanalysis

Quantum computing represents a paradigm shift in computing power by utilizing superposition, entanglement, and quantum interference to complete some jobs exponentially faster for specific problem classes (including integer factorisation) and quadratically faster for unstructured search. This capability poses a fundamental danger to modern cryptography, which is the cornerstone of India's digital infrastructure, including Aadhaar, UPI, Digital India initiatives, banking systems, telecom networks, Critical Information⁸.

Asymmetric cryptography (such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman) is rendered useless on sufficiently large, fault-tolerant quantum computers by Peter Shor's 1994 method, which offers polynomial-time solutions for factoring big numbers and computing discrete logarithms. By providing a quadratic speedup for unstructured search, Lov Grover's 1996 technique practically halves the security of symmetric systems like hash functions and AES. These risks are expanded by new variations, such as quantum algorithms for algebraically structured lattices, the Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm (QAOA), Harrow-Hassidim-Lloyd (HHL) for linear systems, and Brassard-Hoyer-Tapp (BHT) for hash collisions. These variations may weaken even post-quantum candidates or allow hybrid attacks⁹.

The "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HN DL) danger is severe in India because attackers may retain sensitive material that has been encrypted for future quantum decryption. India is aggressively tackling issue with the National Quantum Mission (NQM, authorized 2023 with ₹6,003.65 crore investment) and a specific Task Force on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) migration (report released February 2026). Nonetheless, the legislative framework established by the Digital Personal Data Protection Act of 2023 (DPDP Act), the Information Technology Act of 2000 (IT Act), and court rulings on privacy vs national security provide a complicated

interaction. The algorithms, their risks, their consequences for India, pertinent case laws, governmental reactions, and mitigation strategies are all examined in this paper².

The HNDL threat is not merely theoretical. According to a 2021 assessment by Booz Allen Hamilton, cited by Recorded Future, state-sponsored threat actors are already likely targeting and storing encrypted data with long-term intelligence value, including biometric identifiers, covert source identities, and defence system specifications, for future quantum decryption. These harvested data repositories may include intercepted Aadhaar authentication traffic, UPI transaction metadata, and encrypted diplomatic communications. A subsequent US Department of Homeland Security disclosure confirmed that Chinese state-sponsored actors operating under the designation 'Salt Typhoon' had infiltrated telecommunications infrastructure across multiple Allied nations for sustained intelligence collection. Given that India's digital public infrastructure processes over 24,000 crore UPI transactions annually, the exposure of cryptographically vulnerable transactional records to HNDL campaigns by adversarial state actors constitutes a present threat, not a prospective one.⁴

a. Shor's Algorithm: Exponential Threat to Asymmetric Cryptography

Shor's approach solves the discrete logarithm issue and efficiently factors big semiprimes ($N = p \times q$) by using the Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) to determine a function's period. Shor's lowers factoring a 2048-bit RSA modulus to polynomial time, $O((\log N)^3)$, with high probability on a fault-tolerant quantum computer. Traditionally, factoring a 2048-bit RSA modulus is intractable (requiring $\sim 2^{128}$ operations)¹⁰.

i. Impact on RSA and ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC, such as ECDSA in UPI and Aadhaar-linked systems) and RSA-2048 (standard in TLS, Digital Signatures, and Key Exchange) fail. A quantum computer with around 1 million logical qubits (or about 20 million noise qubits) is thought to be able to factor RSA-2048 in a matter of days or weeks. Because ECC keys are shorter, they are significantly more susceptible¹¹. This puts vital systems in India at risk, including digital public infrastructure (DPI), banking PKI, and secure government communications. Long-term secrets in health, economics, and defense might be revealed by HNDL assaults.

b. Grover's Algorithm: Quadratic Speedup for Symmetric Cryptography and Hash Functions

⁴ Recorded Future, 'Quantum Risk Explained' (Recorded Future Intelligence, 2024)

<<https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/quantum-risk-explained>> accessed 15 September 2026; Booz Allen Hamilton, 'Chinese Threat to Encrypted Data with Long-Term Intelligence Value' (2021) as cited therein.

In contrast to $O(N)$ steps, Grover's approach employs amplitude amplification to search an unstructured database of size N in $O(\sqrt{N})$ steps. This reduces the effective key strength for symmetric cryptography by half: AES-256, which has a classical security of 2^{256} , lowers to about 2^{128} quantum security, which is still strong but requires twice key sizes (like AES-512) for parity¹².

i. Practical Effects: Hash functions (SHA-256 in Blockchain and Certificates) are subject to faster pre-image/collision searches. Grover requires migration or key-length increases but does not completely crack AES. According to India's National Cyber Security Policy, Symmetric Cryptography Safeguards large amounts of data in cloud storage, 5G/6G networks, and IoT devices.

c. Emerging Variants and Advanced Quantum Cryptanalysis

Beyond Shor and Grover, variants target structured problems:

i. Quantum Algorithms for Ideal Lattices¹³

- **The Threat:** Recent quantum algorithms (e.g., by Chen, 2024) propose solving the Principal Ideal Problem (PIP) and Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) in specific structured lattices (cyclotomic rings) in polynomial time.
- **Targeted Schemes:** While general lattice-based cryptography (like standard LWE) was once thought entirely resistant, these results specifically target "structured" or "ideal" lattices, which are often used for efficiency in Ring-LWE (R-LWE) based schemes.
- **Current Status:** NIST-standardized algorithms (CRYSTALS-Kyber/Dilithium) rely on Module-LWE (M-LWE), a variant that mixes structured lattices with random elements. While this new research creates concern, these standardized algorithms are expected to remain resistant in general lattices, though the "gap" in efficiency and security is narrowing. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

ii. BHT Algorithm (Brassard–Høyer–Tapp)¹⁴

- **How it Works:** The BHT algorithm is a quantum collision-finding algorithm that combines the classical "birthday paradox" approach ($O(\sqrt{N})$) with quantum search (Grover's $O(\sqrt{N})$) to find collisions in a function with N possible outputs. It uses Quantum Random Access Memory (qRAM) to achieve a collision in $O(N^{1/3})$ time.
- **Advantage over Grover:** Standard Grover search finds a specific input (preimage) in $O(\sqrt{N})$. BHT finds a collision in $O(N^{1/3})$, which is significantly faster for large hash functions.

- **Limitations:** The main bottleneck is the requirement of large-scale qRAM to store the quantum states, making it difficult to implement in the near term. However, newer versions (Chailloux et al.) have reduced memory requirements while maintaining faster-than-Grover speeds (e.g., $\mathcal{O}(N^{\{2/5\}})$). [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

iii. QAOA and HHL

a) QAOA (Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm)¹⁵

- **Focus:** A hybrid quantum-classical approach, ideal for NISQ (Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum) devices.
- **Application:** It attempts to solve NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems, such as MaxCut or graph partitioning, by optimizing parameters on a classical computer to guide a quantum circuit.
- **Cryptanalysis:** It can be used to solve optimization problems that arise in block cipher analysis or to find nearly optimal attack parameters.

b) HHL (Harrow–Hassidim–Lloyd Algorithm)¹⁶

- **Focus:** An algorithm for solving large linear systems of equations $Ax = b$.
- **Advantage:** It offers an exponential speedup over classical methods, running in logarithmic time relative to the dimension of the matrix.
- **Cryptanalysis:** Applicable to attacking cryptographic systems that rely on linear algebra, such as multivariate cryptography, or in improving side-channel attacks by solving linear systems that leak information. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]

iv. Quantum Differential/Linear Cryptanalysis¹⁷

- **How it Works:** These are quantum versions of classical statistical cryptanalysis. Instead of brute-forcing the key, a quantum computer uses Grover's algorithm to find high-probability differentials or linear trails more efficiently.
- **Enhanced Distinguishers:** Quantum differential cryptanalysis can identify the difference between a block cipher (like AES) and a random permutation using fewer quantum queries (e.g., using $\mathcal{O}(p^{-1/2})$ quantum queries, where (p) is the probability of the differential, compared to $\mathcal{O}(p^{-1})$ classically).
- **Impact:** This allows attackers to extend the number of "attacked rounds" in block ciphers, potentially weakening symmetric primitives faster than expected by classical standards.

These pose risks to hybrid systems and early PQC deployments. In India, where indigenous quantum R&D (via NQM hubs at IISc, IITs, and C-DOT) is scaling, such variants underscore the need for crypto-agility.

d. Quantum Threats in the Indian Digital Ecosystem

Quantum computing poses a severe threat to India's digital ecosystem by potentially breaking current encryption (RSA/ECC) used in Aadhaar, financial transactions, and national security. India's DPI (Aadhaar, UPI, ONDC, CoWIN) relies heavily on RSA/ECC and AES. Quantum developments may enable identity theft, economic espionage, and mass decoding of intercepted communications. Critical industries, such as telecom, power, and defense, are subject to CII-level risks under the IT Act².

Within the existing legal framework, the CERT-In Directions of 28 April 2022, issued under Section 70B(6) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, impose the world's most stringent cyber incident reporting timeline, requiring all service providers, intermediaries, data centres, body corporates, and government organisations to report any cyber security incident to CERT-In within six hours of noticing such incident. Non-compliance carries penalties including imprisonment of up to one year or fine under Section 70B(7). However, these Directions do not address the silent, pre-emptive character of HNDL attacks, which by definition produce no immediately detectable incident at the time of data interception. A data fiduciary whose encrypted Aadhaar records are being harvested today for future quantum decryption would have no reportable incident to disclose within any six-hour window, exposing a critical asymmetry between the Directions' reactive incident-notification model and the prospective, long-gestation nature of quantum cryptanalytic attacks on India's digital infrastructure.⁵

e. India's Legal and Policy Framework

- **National Quantum Mission (NQM, 2023):** Quantum technology, including encrypted communications, will cost ₹6,003.65 crore. The Task Force (under DST, led by C-DOT), requiring PQC migration for corporations by 2033 and CII sectors (defense, telecom, and electricity) by 2029². NIST FIPS 203/204/205 (Kyber, Dilithium, SPHINCS+) adoption; national PQC testing/certification laboratories (Tier 1-3 under

⁵ Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), 'Directions under sub-section (6) of section 70B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 relating to information security practices, procedure, prevention, response and reporting of cyber incidents' (28 April 2022) (CERT-In Directions 2022); Lexology, '2022 CERT-In Directions on Reporting Cyber Incidents' (4 May 2022) <<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5eae7307-664d-484e-8a58-f50bc24bb4d2>> accessed 15 September 2026.

TEC/BIS/STQC); and phased pilots starting in 2027. PQC-QKD hybrid for strategic connections³.

- **IT Act, 2000 (amended):** For the purposes of public order, security, and sovereignty, Section 69 permits decryption and interception (procedural protections required). Blocking is covered under Section 69A, while confidentiality violations are punishable by Section 72. Sector-specific announcements are made about encryption requirements (post-2015 policy, no blanket cap)¹⁸.
- **DPDP Act, 2023:** requires "reasonable security safeguards" (Section 8); violations result in fines of ₹250 crore. Data fiduciaries that handle personal data run the danger of fiduciary responsibility due to quantum non-compliance⁴.
- **TEC Reports (2025):** Standards on QRNG, PQC migration for 5G/B5G, and quantum-secure systems.

f. Relevant Exact Case Laws and Judicial Precedents

Indian courts have not yet adjudicated quantum-specific cryptanalysis (as the threat is emerging), but precedents on privacy, interception, and encryption are directly applicable:

- **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 (9-judge bench):** declared that the right to privacy is protected by Articles 14, 19, and 21. Data protection and informational privacy were emphasized. A decryption mandate must satisfy proportionality (legitimate objective, reasonable relationship, need) since quantum threats increase the hazards to Aadhaar-linked data⁷.
- **People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301:** established rules for phone tapping under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act, which are matched in Section 69 of the IT Act. Interception is only necessary in "public emergencies" or for public safety; it necessitates limited intervention, review committees, and well-reasoned instructions. Orders for quantum decryption would also be scrutinized¹⁹.
- **Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 2 SCC 148:** Article 21's early awareness of privacy prohibits monitoring; the process must be reasonable, fair, and equitable (post-Maneka Gandhi progression).
- **WhatsApp/Meta challenges (ongoing/related PILs, e.g., 2016 PIL dismissed by SC; Delhi HC cases on IT Rules 2021):** Bans or backdoors for originator tracing under IT Rules (traceability) were requested in petitions. Courts weighed end-to-end encryption against national security (Section 69). The SC rejected PILs but upheld the need of encryption for privacy. The Aryan Khan case (2021) demonstrated the viability

of decryption in law enforcement by admitting WhatsApp communications as evidence under Evidence Act Section 65B²⁰.

- **Shalini Kapoor-related 2025 SC observations (digital privacy judgment):** Article 21 safeguards against unrestricted data access were reaffirmed; companies must improve cybersecurity, including encryption, or risk legal repercussions²¹.

These cases establish that while Section 69 decryption is constitutional if proportionate, quantum-era mandates must incorporate PQC safeguards to avoid violating privacy.

g. Existential Implications and Mitigation

Quantum threats could erode trust in DPI, enable state-level espionage, and impose economic costs (est. billions in migration). Recommendations:

- Immediate crypto inventory and crypto-agility (per Task Force).
- Mandate PQC in procurement (CBOMs).
- Invest in national QKD testbeds and indigenous PQC libraries.
- Sectoral regulators (RBI, TRAI, MeitY) to enforce timelines.
- Public-private collaboration via NQM hubs.

India's roadmap positions it as a quantum leader, but accelerated funding and enforcement are critical before "Q-Day."

III. Forging Quantum-Resistant Shields: Evolution of NIST PQC Standards and Cryptographic Agility Frameworks

By enabling "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) attacks on long-lived sensitive data, quantum computing poses a danger to traditional Public-Key Cryptography (such as RSA and ECC). Since 2016, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has led the worldwide standardization of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in order to create algorithms that are resistant to quantum computing. This development in India is closely related to the National Quantum Mission (NQM), the Information Technology Act of 2000, and the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act of 2023, which requires "Reasonable Security Safeguards" (including encryption)². A legally enforceable national plan for PQC migration is provided by the Department of Science and Technology's (DST) Task Force Report (February 2026), which emphasizes cryptographic agility (the capacity to quickly switch algorithms without disruption)²².

a. Historical Evolution and Milestones of NIST PQC Standardization

In 2016, NIST issued a worldwide call for proposals for its PQC standardization effort, which originally attracted 69 applicants. The multi-round evaluation (2017–2022) gave

implementation viability, performance, and security against quantum assaults top priority. The key milestones are:

- **2022:** Selection of primary algorithms—CRYSTALS-Kyber (KEM), CRYSTALS-Dilithium (signature), Falcon, and SPHINCS+ (SLH-DSA).
- **August 13, 2024:** FIPS 203 (Module-Lattice-based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism—ML-KEM, based on Kyber), FIPS 204 (Module-Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm—ML-DSA, based on Dilithium), and FIPS 205 (Stateless Hash-based Digital Signature Standard—SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+) are the first three Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) released. These are advised worldwide and required in government systems in the United States²³.
- **March 11, 2025:** Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) selected as the fifth algorithm (backup KEM) for diversification; Falcon advances toward FIPS 206.

NIST IR 8545 and IR 8547 provide as guidelines for further migration and standardization as of April 2026. India's DST Task Force prioritizes domestic testing while clearly aligning with these FIPS norms².

b. Core NIST-Approved PQC Algorithms: Technical Specifications and Security Analysis

The selected algorithms rely on lattice-based, hash-based, and code-based mathematics resistant to quantum attacks:

- **ML-KEM (FIPS 203):** Lattice-based KEM for key encapsulation; parameters include ML-KEM-512/768/1024 for varying security levels. Offers strong IND-CCA2 security with smaller key sizes than alternatives.
- **ML-DSA (FIPS 204):** Lattice-based signatures; variants ML-DSA-44/65/87 balance security and efficiency.
- **SLH-DSA (FIPS 205):** Stateless hash-based signatures (SPHINCS+); provides conservative security but larger signatures.
- **HQC (2025 selection):** Code-based KEM as a non-lattice backup to mitigate potential future lattice weaknesses.

Even quantum computers are unable to solve issues like Learning With Errors (LWE) and Short Integer Solution (SIS), which are the foundation of security. NIST requires hybrid (Classical + PQC) use during transition in accordance with CNSA 2.0 and related recommendations. According to the DST Report, the TEC/BIS testing framework in India verifies these utilizing

NIST test vectors (v1.0), CAVP/ACVP, and assurance levels L1–L4 for compliance, side-channel resistance, and crypto-agility².

c. Cryptographic Agility Frameworks: Principles, Strategies, and NIST Guidance

Cryptographic agility makes it possible to swap algorithms in protocols, apps, and infrastructure without having to rewrite them. White Paper on NIST Cybersecurity Strategies including modular cryptography libraries/APIs, cryptographic inventories (CBOMs), risk assessment, and governance integration are described in CSWP 39 (December 2025). The essential procedures consist of:

- Decoupling crypto primitives from business logic.
- Supporting hybrid/dual signatures and key establishment.
- Automated key/certificate rotation and fallback mechanisms (downtime <100 ms for OT systems).

Crypto-agility is elevated as a "Core Principle" by India's DST Task Force, which mandates vendor roadmaps for algorithm swaps, integration into CI/CD pipelines, and CBOMs in procurement starting in FY 2026–2027. It suggests centers of excellence under NQM and a specific paper called "Guidelines for Crypto Agility"²⁴. Performance overheads and legacy hard-coded systems provide challenges; solutions focus on API abstraction and regular (9–12 month) algorithm evaluations².

d. India's Regulatory and Policy Framework for PQC Adoption and Data Protection

India's PQC is in compliance with Section 8(1) of the DPDP Act, 2023, which mandates appropriate security measures and specifically lists encryption as technology-neutral and CERT-In. A progressive national plan is established in the historic DST Task Force Report (4 February 2026) under NQM (₹6,003.65 crore, 2023–2030).

- Milestone 1 (Foundations): CII by 31 Dec 2027; Enterprises by 31 Dec 2028 (governance, crypto inventory, pilots, CBOM mandates).
- Milestone 2 (High-Priority Migration): CII by 31 Dec 2028; Enterprises by 31 Dec 2030 (no new classical deployments, PKI/HSM upgrades).
- Milestone 3 (Full Adoption): CII by 31 Dec 2029; Enterprises by 31 Dec 2033 (PQC-only trust chains, layered risk management)².

At the sectoral level, the Securities and Exchange Board of India's Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Framework (CSCRF), issued by circular dated 20 August 2024, has become the first

Indian sectoral regulatory instrument to formally acknowledge post-quantum risk as a compliance obligation for regulated entities. The CSCRF explicitly requires SEBI-regulated entities to maintain inventories of cryptographic assets and to conduct periodic risk assessments that include evaluations of post-quantum risks, with Milestone Institutions and Qualified Regulated Entities required to submit half-yearly and annual compliance self-assessments respectively. This sectoral mandate operationalises, in the financial markets domain, the cryptographic inventory and crypto-agility requirements that the DST Task Force's roadmap envisages for Critical Information Infrastructure more broadly, and signals the direction in which RBI and IRDAI are likely to follow with their own quantum-risk guidance for the banking and insurance sectors.⁶

In accordance with NIST FIPS, the Draft Framework for Testing and Certification (TEC-led) establishes L1–L4 assurance levels and Tier-1/2/3 laboratories (operational by December 2026), giving priority to domestic solutions under AtmaNirbhar Bharat. For strategic connections, QKD enhances PQC. PQC-readiness will be required for procurement orders starting in 2026.

e. Landmark Indian Case Laws and Judicial Precedents on Cryptographic Security and Privacy

Although there isn't any direct PQC lawsuit since technology is still in its infancy, fundamental precedents apply security requirements that are pertinent to PQC migration:

- **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1:** A nine-judge panel held that under Article 21, privacy is a basic right. Encryption requirements are governed by the proportionality test (legitimate objective, reasonable link, least restrictive methods, balance). This gives the DPDP Act, 2023 and IT Rules credibility; in the absence of "reasonable security safeguards," poor encryption may infringe privacy²⁵.
- **Challenges to IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, Rule 4(2):** In Delhi High Court applications (transferred by the Supreme Court in 2024), WhatsApp and Meta argue that traceability rules violate end-to-end encryption and are thus unlawful under Puttaswamy. Hearings are still ongoing as of

⁶ Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), 'Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Framework (CSCRF) for SEBI Regulated Entities' (Circular No SEBI/HO/ITD-1/ITD_CSC_EXT/P/CIR/2024/113, 20 August 2024) <<https://www.sebi.gov.in>> accessed 15 September 2026; Kratikal, 'Navigating SEBI's 2024 Updated Cybersecurity Framework: Key Revisions' (7 October 2025) <<https://kratikal.com/blog/navigating-sebi-2024-updated-cybersecurity-framework-key-revisions/>> accessed 15 September 2026.

2026; the Supreme Court has criticized "take-it-or-leave-it" policies but has not rendered a decision. This highlights conflicts between unbreakable encryption and national security, which are closely related to PQC hybrid designs²⁶.

- **Ongoing DPDP Act Constitutionality Challenge (Supreme Court, Feb 2026):** RTI changes under Section 8(1)(j) and striking a balance between privacy and the access to information were referred to the Constitution Bench. The Court highlighted "Complex and Sensitive Issues" and issued notifications but denied a stay. This reaffirms the need for data fiduciaries to put in place quantum-resistant security measures to prevent privacy rights violations in the future²⁷.

These cases mandate crypto-agility and PQC to fulfil constitutional security duties.

f. Latest Challenges, Issues, Updates, and Strategic Roadmap for Quantum-Resistant Transition in India

- **2025–2026 Updates:** Global timescales are accelerated by NIST's HQC selection (March 2025) and CISA product categories (January 2026). With CII deadlines two to four years ahead of many peers, India's DST Report (February 2026) is the most ambitious national strategy since NIST FIPS. By December 2026, the labs will be operational; interim TEC permissions are available.
- **Key Challenges:** HNDL assaults on long-lived data (e.g., Aadhaar, UPI), vendor documentation gaps for hardware validation, performance overheads (bigger PQC keys/signatures), skills shortages, and legacy interoperability (hybrid hazards). The AtmaNirbhar push contrasts with reliance on foreign ecosystems.
- **Strategic Recommendations (India-Specific):**
 - a. Embed crypto-agility in all procurements and CI/CD (per DST).
 - b. Prioritize indigenous PQC/QKD under NQM testbeds.
 - c. Sectoral regulators (RBI, SEBI, DoT) enforce milestone compliance.
 - d. Assume breach; maintain hybrid during transition; diversify algorithms.
 - e. Capacity building for CISOs via Centres of Excellence.

India is positioned as a quantum-resilient leader by its plan, but its success depends on judicial adherence to Puttaswamy principles, investment continuity, and coordinated execution. To achieve the deadlines of 2027–2029, organizations must start cryptography inventories and pilots right away.

IV. Harnessing Quantum Entanglement for Key Exchange: Advances in QKD Systems and Terrestrial –Satellite Integration

In order to provide unconditionally safe key exchange between parties, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) makes use of the no-cloning theorem, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and quantum entanglement. Because measurement disrupts the shared quantum state, entanglement-based QKD methods instantly identify any effort at eavesdropping, in contrast to classical encryption, which depends on computational hardness assumptions susceptible to future quantum computers. This is demonstrated by the 1991 Ekert-91 (E91) protocol, which ensures device-independent security even against faulty or corrupted hardware by distributing entangled photon pairs and confirming security through Bell inequality breaches²⁸.

The National Quantum Mission (NQM), which was authorized in April 2023 with a budget of ₹6,003.65 crore (2023–2031), has expedited the development of QKD systems in India. India is already among the world leaders in quantum-secure communication for vital infrastructure, banking, and defense thanks to recent achievements including entanglement-based free-space connections and a 1,000 km domestic QKD network that was proven in less than two years. These developments meet India's large geographic area while adhering to constitutional privacy requirements by fusing terrestrial fibre/free-space systems with newly developed satellite capabilities²⁹.

a. Principles of Quantum Entanglement in QKD Protocols: E91, BBM92, and Device-Independent Security

When quantum entanglement occurs, correlated photon pairs are created (for example, in the Bell state $|\Psi^-\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle_A|V\rangle_B - |V\rangle_A|H\rangle_B)$, where subscripts represent Alice and Bob). This means that measuring one instantaneously determines the state of the other, regardless of distance. In the E91 protocol, Alice and Bob measure entangled photons in randomly selected bases; a subset of the findings verifies that no eavesdropper (Eve) has secretly intercepted by testing Bell's inequality ($S > 2$ contradicts local realism). After privacy amplification and error correction, the remaining bits make up the raw key³⁰.

By using BB84-style sifting on entangled pairs, the BBM92 protocol improves this for practicality and preserves entanglement-based security without requiring explicit Bell tests during key generation. These enable device-independent QKD (DI-QKD), where security is maintained even if measurement devices are untrusted, and outperform prepare-and-measure techniques (e.g., BB84) in noisy channels²⁸.

This was shown in June 2025 by the DRDO-IIT Delhi partnership in India: entanglement-assisted free-space QKD over >1 km on the IIT Delhi campus produced a secure key rate of ~240 bits/s with quantum bit error rate (QBER) <7%—well below secure criteria. This

validated E91-like protocols for actual Indian settings, building on 2024 entanglement dispersion across 100 km telecom-grade fibre³¹.

b. Breakthroughs in Terrestrial QKD Systems: Fibre-Optic Networks and Free-Space Demonstrations

Terrestrial QKD is deployed using free-space optical (FSO) lines or optical fibre (using single-photon or entangled sources). Without trusted nodes (intermediate relays that measure and re-encode keys, adding trust assumptions), direct linkages are limited to around 100–200 km due to photon loss in fibre networks (~ 0.2 dB/km at 1550 nm). Fibre-laying expenses in difficult terrain are eliminated with FSO³².

In late 2025, QNu Labs, a DST-backed NQM firm in India, showed a 500 km QKD network using existing Army optical fibre in Rajasthan (Southern Command Signals). By April 2026, it will have scaled to a 1,000 km ultra-secure network, one of the longest deployments in the world². This protects defense and financial data using wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) on commercial fibre and native QKD with reliable nodes. In the past, DRDO and IIT Delhi established a 100 km intercity fibre link (Prayagraj–Vindhyachal, 2022) and up to 380 km of trusted-node-free QKD in regular telecom fibre²⁹.

This is complemented by advancements in free-space terrestrial technology: the 2025 >1 km entanglement-based FSO demo opens the door for harsh or urban installations without interfering with infrastructure. In order to achieve NQM's 2,000 kilometer inter-city goal, these systems use Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) hybrids for backward compatibility³³

c. Satellite-Based QKD: Overcoming Distance Limitations and Global-Indian Synergies

By avoiding fibre attenuation, satellite QKD uses low-Earth orbit (LEO) platforms to distribute secure keys around the world. Because downlink (satellite-to-ground) has less air loss than uplink, it usually produces greater key rates. E91/BBM92 protocols are made possible at intercontinental distances via entanglement dispersion (e.g., China's Micius satellite reached 1,200 km in 2017)³⁴.

- India's progress: As a prelude, ISRO demonstrated free-space QKD over 300 m using native single-photon/entanglement technology. A dedicated quantum satellite (such as the SAQTI idea) is scheduled for launch in two to three years³⁵. Under NQM, satellite-based secure quantum communications targeting 2,000 km within India (as well as inter-country connectivity) are deliverables. Fibre relays are used with satellite-ground connectivity in hybrid experiments².

d. Terrestrial–Satellite Integration: Hybrid Quantum Networks and Architectural Advances

Using trusted nodes or quantum repeaters/memory for end-to-end security, hybrid networks combine fibre (high-rate, short-range) with satellite (global reach) and FSO (flexible last-mile). Quantum error correction and entanglement switching help to address three major issues: loss, decoherence, and handover³³. NQM proposes a pan-Indian Quantum Internet with local access (QUILA) that connects cities via a 2,000-kilometer backbone that combines satellite QKD with PQC and quantum memory with terrestrial fibre and free-space³⁶.

Hybrid trusted-node architecture is already used over Army infrastructure in India's 1,000 km fibre milestone (QNu Labs, 2026); DRDO's entanglement demonstrations allow for smooth FSO–satellite transfers. Space-ground integrated payloads are the subject of programs like SAMGNYA (CDOT). With 2026 examples demonstrating 400% distance growth in two years, this hybrid solution protects multi-node networks for national security.

Integrating quantum key distribution (QKD) with existing infrastructure enables a resilient multi-node quantum network, directly aligning with India's National Quantum Mission (NQM). By moving beyond point-to-point links to a meshed architecture, integrated systems eliminate single-point failures and enhance security. Furthermore, using commercial fibre and underwater cables supports extending quantum communication undersea and underground, fostering a secure, national-scale quantum ecosystem that spans terrestrial, maritime, and sub-surface domains.

e. Indian Legal and Policy Ecosystem: Privacy Jurisprudence, Regulatory Frameworks, and Strategic Imperatives

The QKD movement in India is supported by a strong constitutional foundation. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) Vs. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the right to privacy is a basic right inherent in Article 21 (life and personal liberty), which is connected to Articles 14 (equality) and 19 (freedoms). The nine-judge panel overturned M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1962), concluding that privacy includes both protection from arbitrary governmental monitoring and informational liberty. This immediately supports quantum-secure communications: Puttaswamy's proportionality criteria for data protection is satisfied by entanglement-based QKD, which guarantees eavesdropping detection.

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act), which requires permission, purpose limitation, and security measures, was sparked by the ruling. It is supplemented by the Information Technology Act, 2000 (as modified) and CERT-In guidelines for cybersecurity.

By offering information-theoretic security against quantum attackers, quantum cryptography fills the legislative voids in IT Rules 2021.

These are included into national strategy through NQM and DRDO/ISRO initiatives: QKD maintains Puttaswamy's dignity-autonomy balance while protecting vital infrastructure, defense networks, and Aadhaar-linked systems from potential attacks. Export restrictions, standardization (BIS/ISO alignment), and fair access are policy obstacles, however India's dedication to quantum sovereignty is demonstrated by 2025–2026 goals.

In a nutshell unbreakable secure communication is heralded by India's entanglement-driven QKD developments, which include 1,000 km fibre networks, >1 km FSO entanglement demonstrations, and impending satellite integration. These advancements strengthen national security while promoting global quantum leadership. They are based on NQM deliverables and Puttaswamy jurisprudence. PIB releases (2025–2026), Ekert (1991), technical papers from DRDO–IIT Delhi, and official NQM documents are important sources. The full potential of this revolutionary technology will be realized through ongoing R&D in quantum repeaters and regulatory harmonization.

V. Quantum Supremacy in Anomaly Detection: Quantum Machine Learning Paradigms for Next-Generation Threat Intelligence

When it comes to anomaly identification in cybersecurity threat intelligence, quantum supremacy—the proven capacity of quantum computers to solve particular problems that are unsolvable for classical systems in a reasonable amount of time—holds revolutionary promise. The exponential increase of high-dimensional, noisy datasets from network logs, endpoint telemetry, and multi-source threat feeds presents a challenge to traditional machine learning (ML) techniques. By utilizing superposition, entanglement, and interference, quantum machine learning (QML) paradigms offer exponential speedups in feature extraction, kernel computations, and optimization for detecting minute deviations suggestive of advanced persistent threats (APTs), insider threats, or zero-day exploits. With a focus on useful paradigms, comparative benefits, and smooth integration into actual cybersecurity ecosystems, this paper investigates the confluence of quantum supremacy with QML for next-generation threat intelligence. Advanced detection directly aids compliance and national security in the Indian environment, where it is in line with national imperatives for data sovereignty, privacy, and resilient infrastructure³⁷.

a. Theoretical Foundations: Quantum Supremacy and Its Intersection with Machine Learning

Quantum supremacy goes beyond proof-of-concept to machine learning by allowing quantum kernels and variational algorithms to analyse large feature spaces that are unmanageable for traditional support vector machines or neural networks. It was first experimentally verified in jobs like random circuit sampling. This is demonstrated in anomaly detection by quantum amplitude estimation and Quantum-Enhanced Principal Component Analysis (QPCA), which effectively detect outliers in covariance matrices of high-dimensional cyber data without requiring extensive conventional sampling. Quantum Support Vector Machines (QSVMs), Quantum Neural Networks (QNNs), and hybrid quantum-classical Variational Quantum Circuits (VQCs) are QML paradigms that use quantum parallelism to map classical data into Hilbert space, where entanglement captures non-linear correlations that classical kernels miss. These underpinnings support claims of dominance in threat intelligence, where petabyte-scale records from 5G/edge networks are difficult for traditional machine learning to handle. For unsupervised anomaly problems, rigorous benchmarking reveals that QML variations achieve quadratic or exponential benefits in training complexity, especially under Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) devices moving to fault-tolerant regimes³⁷.

b. Quantum Machine Learning Paradigms Tailored for Anomaly Detection

Supervised QSVMs with quantum feature maps (like ZZ or angle encoding) that classify normal vs. anomalous network flows with superior generalization on limited labelled data, unsupervised Quantum Auto Encoders And Generative Adversarial Networks (QGANs) that reconstruct data distributions and identify high reconstruction errors as threats, and quantum reinforcement learning for adaptive threat hunting in dynamic environments are important QML paradigms for anomaly detection. Current implementations are dominated by hybrid approaches: quantum circuits are fed by classical pre-processing for kernel estimation or optimization using the Quantum Approximation Optimization Algorithm (QAOA)³⁷. Reviews categorize these into three paradigms: supervised (such as quantum one-class SVM), unsupervised (such as quantum clustering via amplitude encoding), and reinforcement. These paradigms show resilience to session drift and data scarcity, which is crucial for changing cyber threats. In actuality, these paradigms handle network data in parallel, outperforming traditional isolation forests or auto encoders in identifying minute irregularities like lateral movement or command-and-control beacons³⁸.

c. Quantum-Enhanced Anomaly Detection in Cybersecurity and Threat Intelligence

QML in threat intelligence enables real-time correlation across several sources, such as SIEM logs, Endpoint Detection Response (EDR) data, and dark web feeds, by leveraging quantum speedups in similarity search and pattern recognition. Quantum-enhanced systems outperform

conventional ML in precision-recall for APT detection using quantum kernel approaches that incorporate threat indicators in exponentially large feature spaces, making them superior at identifying zero-day irregularities³⁸. Applications include variational quantum classifiers for behavioural anomaly scoring in User/Entity Behaviour Analytics (UEBA) and quantum-augmented graph neural networks for modelling attack graphs. Quantum amplitude amplification reduces false positives that afflict classical systems and helps threat intelligence platforms discover uncommon events in large datasets. Empirical research validates QML's advantage in cybersecurity audits, where it detects data exfiltration or insider threats through minute statistical deviations that rule-based or traditional deep-learning models are unable to detect³⁹.

d. Comparative Analysis: Quantum Supremacy over Classical Machine Learning in High-Dimensional Threat Data

In cyber datasets with more than millions of features, Classical Machine Learning (ML) techniques like random forests, LSTMs, and isolated forests are limited by the curse of dimensionality, which results in exponential computational scaling and decreased accuracy under noise. This is countered by quantum supremacy, which uses quantum linear algebra subroutines (such as HHL algorithm versions) that solve linear systems in polylog time and a Grover-like search for anomalies. Benchmarks show that while QPCA decreases dimensionality with logarithmic qubit scaling as opposed to the polynomial cost of traditional PCA, QSVMs provide 10–100x speedups in kernel matrix computing for anomaly scoring. Particularly for sparse anomalies in threat intelligence, hybrid QML preserves classical accuracy while offering quantum benefits in generalization. Error-corrected quantum systems portray unquestionable superiority for real-time threat correlation, placing QML as the paradigm shift for next-generation intelligence platforms, notwithstanding limitations in NISQ-era noise⁴⁰.

e. Regulatory Compliance and Legal Precedents in the Indian Context: DPDP Act, IT Act, and Puttaswamy Framework

Strong anomaly detection is required by Indian law as a fundamental security measure, and QML paradigms directly reinforce this requirement. Section 8 of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) requires data fiduciaries processing personal data, including threat intelligence feeds, to implement "reasonable security safeguards" that include encryption, access controls, and breach detection mechanisms. Failure to comply with these requirements results in fines and required notifications⁴¹. This is consistent with the landmark ruling in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) Vs. Union of India (2017) (Writ Petition (Civil) No.

494 of 2012), in which a nine-judge Supreme Court bench unanimously declared privacy to be a fundamental right under Article 21 (right to life and liberty), interwoven with Articles 14 and 19, establishing proportionality and necessity tests for data processing that QML must meet in order to prevent overreach in surveillance or profiling⁴².

In addition, charges for data breaches are supported by the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) through Sections 66 (hacking), 72A (breach of confidentiality), and historical 43A duties (now harmonized under DPDP), where insufficient anomaly detection is considered carelessness. Quantum-enhanced systems enable proactive, high-precision detection in banking and critical infrastructure breaches documented in 2025 analyses⁴³. CERT-In guidelines specifically recommend Network Behaviour Anomaly Detection (NBAD) and SIEM tools for real-time monitoring, with mandatory 6-hour incident reporting. Thus, QML implementations fulfil DPDP's algorithmic due diligence for automated processing while ensuring compliance by including privacy-by-design (e.g., federated quantum learning limiting raw data exposure), reconciling technical superiority with constitutional privacy imperatives⁴⁴.

f. Strategic Roadmap: India's National Quantum Mission, Implementation Challenges, and Policy Imperatives

In addition to post-quantum cryptography for cybersecurity resilience and quantum key distribution (QKD) networks spanning 2000 km, India's National Quantum Mission (NQM), approved in April 2023 with ₹6,003.65 crore funding through 2030–31, aims to develop intermediate-scale quantum computers (50–1000 physical qubits) across superconducting and photonic platforms. Thematic centers, such as IIT Madras/C-DOT for communication and IISc Bengaluru for computing, provide priority to QML applications in threat intelligence, directly assisting with anomaly detection for vital national infrastructure². Through hybrid quantum-classical deployments and DRDO-led quantum-safe encryption programs, issues such as NISQ noise, qubit scalability, skill gaps, and integration costs are addressed. Policy requirements compel the incorporation of QML into DPDP-compliant designs and CERT-In frameworks, promoting public-private collaborations for quantum-resilient threat platforms⁴⁵. This approach upholds Puttaswamy's required privacy while positioning India as a quantum leader and converting dominance into sovereign threat intelligence.

In summary, quantum supremacy through QML paradigms signals a paradigm change in threat intelligence anomaly detection, providing unmatched speed and accuracy while requiring strict alignment with India's legal and strategic ecosystem. To achieve next-generation cybersecurity resilience, implementation must strike a balance between innovation and constitutional protections.

VI. Convergent Security Ecosystems: Hybrid PQC-QKD Architectures and Fault-Tolerant Quantum Integration Strategies

By combining quantum key distribution (QKD), which uses the no-cloning theorem and Heisenberg uncertainty of quantum mechanics for information-theoretic security in key exchange, with post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which relies on computationally challenging mathematical problems resistant to quantum algorithms like Shor's, convergent security ecosystems represent a paradigm shift in cryptographic resilience. Layered, defense-in-depth security is provided by hybrid PQC-QKD architectures: QKD offers perfect forward secrecy and eavesdropping detection for high-assurance connections, while PQC guarantees scalable, software-upgradable quantum resistance throughout classical networks. In order to enable safe quantum-accelerated operations like random number generation, key management, or simulation without jeopardizing overall system integrity, fault-tolerant quantum integration strategies further integrate scalable quantum processors (protected by quantum error correction codes) into these ecosystems².

The National Quantum Mission (NQM), which was authorized in April 2023 with an outlay of ₹6,003.65 crore, and the Department of Science and Technology (DST) Task Force Report on "Implementation of Quantum Safe Ecosystem in India" from February 2026 are directly related to this convergence in the Indian context. In order to protect critical information infrastructure (CII) against "harvest-now-decrypt-later" attacks, the paper specifically supports hybrid PQC-QKD deployments, national testbeds, and staggered migration timetables. It also highlights indigenous solutions under AtmaNirbhar Bharat. Technical architectures, strategic implementation, and the Indian legal and regulatory environment—where privacy jurisprudence and legislative mandates impose affirmative responsibilities of adequate security—are all integrated in this study's five key subheadings.

a. Foundational Principles: Complementary Strengths of PQC and QKD in Hybrid Security Models

By using lattice-based, hash-based, or code-based hardness assumptions that withstand both classical and quantum assaults, PQC algorithms (NIST-standardized ML-KEM for key encapsulation, ML-DSA for signatures) solve quantum weaknesses in asymmetric encryption. In contrast, QKD uses single-photon transmission across optical fibre or free-space networks to offer unconditional security for symmetric key distribution; any interception disrupts quantum states and causes discovery².

i. Hybrid models exploit complementarity: PQC protects end-to-end traffic across the current DWDM infrastructure and authenticates conventional post-processing channels, while QKD provides high-entropy keys for backbone lines that are impervious to computational assaults. Inter-city topologies are used by the DST Task Force to demonstrate this. Local QKD nodes (yellow) create keys that are routed to PQC-compliant encryptors (green) across traditional lines, guaranteeing that a compromise of one layer does not reveal the session key (e.g., via XOR or HKDF combination)².

ii. Crypto-agility is foundational: Systems must be able to switch algorithms without interruption. This idea serves as the foundation for India's TEC 91010:2023 standards for both conventional and quantum-safe cryptography systems, which need QRNG/TRNG augmentation for entropy and hybrid handshakes (such as TLS 1.3 with PQC integration). Here, redundant verification and side-channel resistance provide fault tolerance by preventing single-point failures in quantum channels that are susceptible to ambient noise or weaknesses in trusted-node relays.

b. Architectural Design of Hybrid PQC-QKD Systems: Protocols, Integration, and Scalability

Hybrid structures incorporate layered, modular designs. Authenticated hybrid key exchange (such as Muckle+ variations) is one of the core protocols. QKD's traditional reconciliation and privacy-amplification phases are secured by PQC signatures, and QKD-derived keys feed into PQC KEMs for final session content. Resilience is ensured by either serial ($K = \text{QKD} \oplus \text{PQC}$) or parallel ($K = \text{HKDF}(\text{QKD} \parallel \text{PQC})$) key combination; if either primitive fails, security is maintained⁴⁶.

i. Integration occurs at multiple layers: (i) Physical: QKD over dark fiber coexists with classical DWDM via wavelength multiplexing; (ii) Network: PQC provides end-to-end authentication while trusted relays or optical switches replace vulnerable nodes; (iii) Application: PQC-ready PKI and hardware security modules (HSMs) integrate QKD-derived keys through APIs. Scalability makes use of India's current optical-fiber infrastructure: PQC is used for last-mile and non-fiber portions, while the NQM Quantum Communication Hub (IIT Madras + C-DOT) aims for 2,000 km inter-city QKD².

ii. Recent Indian deployments exemplify this: Using domestic DV-QKD hardware and combining hybrid topologies (point-to-point, hub-and-spoke) with PQC for corporate encryptors, QNu Labs, a startup funded by NQM, built a 1,000 km QKD

network in less than two years. Rigor is determined by assurance levels (L1–L4) according to the DST framework; L4 (critical infrastructure) calls for native hardware, complete QKD integration readiness, and fault-injection resilience testing².

c. Fault-Tolerant Quantum Computing Strategies for Secure Ecosystem Integration

Error-corrected quantum processors are integrated into security ecosystems through fault-tolerant quantum integration, which reduces de-coherence and gate faults that affect Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) devices. Scalable quantum operations like QRNG at enterprise scale or safe multi-party computing for key management are made possible by surface codes and concatenated codes, which reach logical error rates below physical criteria (e.g., $\sim 10^{-15}$ for cryptographic usefulness)².

i. Strategies include: (i) hybrid quantum-classical orchestration, in which classical PQC/QKD layers guard control channels while quantum hardware creates keys or mimics red-teaming attacks; (ii) crypto-agility at the hardware level, in which quantum post-processing is authenticated by PQC signatures; and (iii) zero-trust quantum gateways, which isolate quantum nodes behind PQC-secured tunnels. Scalable processors are developed at the NQM Quantum Computing Hub (IISc Bengaluru), and Level 3/4 certification requires redundant verification and fault-resistant programming².

Fault tolerance in convergent ecosystems goes beyond hardware to system resilience: hybrid designs need PQC fall back to withstand partial QKD outages, while Grover's method implications require doubled symmetric key lengths. In line with the Public Procurement Order 2019 for cyber-security goods, India's strategy places a higher priority on domestic fault-tolerant modules to lessen reliance on international suppliers.

d. National Implementation Frameworks: Testbeds, Pilots, and Indigenous Development under NQM

India's framework operationalizes convergence using the three-phase roadmap developed by the DST Task Force. Milestone 1 (foundations, by December 2027 for CII and December 2028 for enterprises): PQC/hybrid pilots, crypto-agility procurement, risk assessment, and cryptographic inventory. Milestone 2 (high-priority migration, 2028–2030): hybrid testbeds and PKI/HSMs prepared for PQC. Milestone 3: PQC-default chains with stacked QKD for strategic connections (full adoption, 2029–2033)².

National testbeds assess hybrid handshakes, interoperability, and QKD integration in accordance with TEC GRs by utilizing NQM's four Thematic Hubs and current labs (STQC, BIS, CERT-In, CDAC). Risk-aligned assurance is ensured via tiered certification (L1–L4),

with enhanced fault-injection and side-channel analysis handled by Tier-3 laboratories. QNu Labs' 1,000 km deployment and proprietary hybrid systems (QShield) that include QKD, PQC, and QRNG are examples of indigenous concentration².

In order to build a robust national quantum-secure backbone, sectoral pilots focus on banking, telecom, electricity, and defense. Playbooks for Quantum Risk Assessment and Crypto Bill of Materials (CBOM) formalize governance.

e. Regulatory, Legal, and Compliance Imperatives: Indian Statutes, Case Law, and Policy Alignment

Quantum-safe migration is currently required under Indian law's positive security requirements, which are technology-neutral. Digital signatures and reasonable security procedures for sensitive data are governed by the Information Technology Act, 2000 (Sections 5, 43A, and 70); the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (Section 8 and Rule 6(1)(a)) requires "appropriate" safeguards, which are interpreted as requiring quantum-resistant encryption given foreseeable threats. SEBI's Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Framework (CSCRF, deadlines 2025) and CERT-In guidelines further tighten encryption requirements for financial institutions⁴⁷.

In the seminal case of *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) Vs. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 (9-judge Constitution Bench)*, it was determined that privacy, including informational privacy and autonomy over personal data, is a basic right under Article 21. In relation to quantum-vulnerable encryption, where "Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later" attacks could retroactively compromise retained records under data-retention mandates, the Court stressed that state and private actors must adopt proportionate, necessary measures to protect data from unwarranted intrusion⁴⁸. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023's subsequent reasoning upholds the acceptance of electronic evidence only in cases where integrity (via secure cryptography) can be shown; quantum-compromised signatures run the danger of being excluded from evidence⁴⁹. The DST Task Force roadmap incorporates these requirements: prompt hybrid adoption is encouraged by DPDPA fines (up to ₹250 crore), while certification requires adherence to ISO/IEC 19790, IETF RFCs, and TEC standards. The Public Procurement Order 2019 closes the gap between technology, regulation, and constitutional privacy protections by giving priority to domestic quantum-safe solutions.

In summary, India is positioned as a worldwide leader in quantum-resilient infrastructure thanks to its convergent security ecosystems, which are based on NQM-driven hybrid PQC-QKD designs and fault-tolerant quantum techniques. In the quantum age, timely implementation of the 2026 Task Force proposals, supported by statutory requirements and

privacy jurisprudence from the Puttaswamy period, will protect economic development, national sovereignty, and basic rights.

VII. Navigating the Quantum Cybersecurity Frontier: Regulatory Mandates, Ethical Quandaries, and Socioeconomic Ramifications

The exponential processing power of quantum computing, made possible by superposition and entanglement, poses a danger to the asymmetric cryptography that underpins India's digital economy⁵⁰. In light of this, the National Quantum Mission (NQM), which has been allocated ₹6,003.65 crore, promotes domestic quantum-safe infrastructure while highlighting socioeconomic disparities, ethical dilemmas, and regulatory gaps². As a result, India's legal system must adapt to safeguard important data, uphold constitutional values, and ensure inclusive growth in the post-quantum era.

a. Regulatory Mandates: Bridging Gaps in the IT Act, 2000 and DPDP Act, 2023

The Information Technology Act of 2000 does not specifically mandate post-quantum cryptography (PQC), but it does recognize asymmetric cryptosystems and digital signatures under Section 5 and provide the Central Government the authority to specify encryption modes under Section 84A. Although "reasonable security practices" for personal data are required under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, quantum-susceptible algorithms are left out, leaving fiduciaries open to harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks. Targeting vital industries like banking, defense, and telecom, NQM's Task Force has reacted with a risk-based certification system that defines four assurance levels (L1–L4) for PQC products and a three-tier national laboratory structure under BIS, STQC, and CERT-In. In order to prevent compliance paralysis, sectoral regulators must now set crypto-agility timetables to align outdated systems with quantum-resistant standards².

b. Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration and Certification Imperatives

MeitY and CERT-In are in charge of India's quantum-safe roadmap, which requires inventorying assets that rely on cryptography and gradually switching to PQC algorithms that have been authorized by NIST. Under NQM's Quantum Communication Hub, the proposed framework prioritizes satellite-based secure linkages and domestic QKD networks that cover 1,000 km (with a target of 2,000 km by 2027). Crypto-agility protocols must be implemented by organizations managing long-shelf-life data in order to guarantee side-channel resistance and interoperability. There is a risk of national security breaches if sovereign infrastructure is not certified at L3/L4 levels. Therefore, authorities must provide compliance incentives for SMEs and mandatory deadlines for high-risk firms⁵¹.

The most recent and significant development in India's quantum-safe regulatory trajectory occurred on 11 September 2026, when Reserve Bank of India Deputy Governor Shirish Chandra Murmu, in his keynote address at the Global FinTech Fest 2026 in Mumbai, publicly called upon Indian payment system providers and network operators to begin migrating towards quantum-proof payment infrastructure. Citing the RBI's constitution of an expert committee on a Quantum Secure and Adaptive Financial Ecosystem, and referencing the Bank for International Settlements Innovation Hub's Project LEAP, which replaced traditional digital signatures with post-quantum cryptography in a liquidity transfer experiment, the Deputy Governor warned that payment infrastructure has long technology cycles and deeply embedded cryptographic dependencies, meaning migration must begin immediately. The context is stark: UPI processed approximately 24,162 crore transactions worth around Rs 314 lakh crore in FY 2025-26, representing approximately 85 per cent of India's digital payment transactions by volume. A quantum compromise of this ecosystem's cryptographic layer would be catastrophic for India's digital economy, and the RBI's public acknowledgment of this urgency represents a significant escalation in regulatory pressure on payment operators to adopt post-quantum cryptographic standards.⁷

c. Ethical Quandaries: Privacy, Sovereignty, and the Spectre of Quantum Surveillance

Although quantum key distribution offers unbreakable encryption, it also poses serious ethical questions about data ownership and governmental monitoring capabilities. In *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) Vs. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1*, the constitutional panel ruled that privacy is a basic right under Article 21, protecting informational self-determination as well. This right is put in jeopardy by quantum computing's ability to decipher stored data, necessitating stringent proportionality tests for any state access. In order to maintain India's digital sovereignty without jeopardizing democratic accountability, ethical deployment necessitates open administration of QKD networks to avoid abuse against people and protect against foreign quantum espionage.

The ethical dimensions of quantum surveillance are compounded by the confirmed activities of state-sponsored adversaries already conducting HNDL collection against Indian-linked data. Intelligence assessments and cybersecurity research identify that state actors with advanced

⁷ ANI, 'Time has come to quantum-proof India's payment systems, says RBI Dy Governor Murmu' (11 September 2026) <<https://aninews.in/news/business/time-has-come-to-quantum-proof-indias-payment-systems-says-rbi-dy-governor-murmu20260911152137/>> accessed 15 September 2026; MediaNama, 'RBI asks payment operators to start quantum-proofing at GFF 2026' (11 September 2026) <<https://www.medianama.com/2026/09/223-rbi-payment-operators-quantum-proofing-gff-2026/>> accessed 15 September 2026.

signals intelligence capabilities routinely intercept and archive encrypted telecommunications traffic, diplomatic cables, and financial data with the specific expectation that quantum computing will eventually render that archived material readable. For India, a country whose digital public infrastructure serves over a billion Aadhaar-enrolled individuals and whose strategic communications traverse networks with known interception vulnerabilities, the HNDL threat represents a form of prospective surveillance that existing constitutional and statutory safeguards are not yet equipped to address. The proportionality framework mandated by the Puttaswamy judgment for any lawful interception must be extended conceptually to impose a positive obligation on the State to deploy quantum-resistant encryption precisely because the failure to do so enables de facto mass surveillance by foreign state actors through HNDL, without any contemporaneous act of interception that Indian law could regulate or remediate.⁸

d. Judicial Precedents Shaping Quantum Cybersecurity Jurisprudence

For problems arising in the quantum age, landmark decisions offer interpretative moorings. The Supreme Court invalidated Section 66A of the IT Act for ambiguity in *Shreya Singhal Vs. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1*, highlighting the need for cybersecurity laws to protect free expression. Section 65B certifications were required for the acceptance of electronic evidence in *Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473*. This need is presently under pressure due to quantum-tampered records under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. In order to ensure evidential integrity and proportionality in quantum-secured settings, regulators must include judicially supported measures. Courts will be examining whether "Reasonable Security Practices" under the DPDP Act include PQC migration.

e. Socioeconomic Ramifications: Resilience, Equity, and Workforce Transformation

Quantum threats imperil critical infrastructure, potentially causing trillions in economic losses through compromised banking and defence systems. NQM's thrust on indigenous PQC and QKD fosters self-reliance, yet widens the digital divide: large enterprises can afford L4 certification while SMEs face prohibitive costs. Socioeconomically, the transition demands massive skilling in quantum cryptography, risking obsolescence for traditional cybersecurity professionals. Equitable outcomes require targeted subsidies, public-private quantum hubs, and

⁸ Recorded Future, 'Quantum Risk Explained' (Recorded Future Intelligence, 2024)

<<https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/quantum-risk-explained>> accessed 15 September 2026; Freshfields, 'Quantum disentangled: Harvest now, decrypt later — The quantum threat is already here' (9 December 2025)

<<https://technologyquotient.freshfields.com/post/1021x4l/quantum-disentangled-1-harvest-now-decrypt-later-the-quantum-threat-is-alr>> accessed 15 September 2026.

inclusive policies that channel NQM benefits toward rural digital infrastructure and MSMEs, converting quantum risk into an engine for inclusive growth and global competitiveness.

In a nutshell India's ability to successfully navigate the quantum cybersecurity frontier depends on the smooth integration of socioeconomic fairness, ethical vigilance, and regulatory foresight. The country may secure its digital future by turning existential dangers into a strategic advantage by utilizing NQM-driven frameworks and judicial acumen.

Conclusion

A paradigm change that enhances defensive capabilities while revealing fundamental flaws in modern cryptographic frameworks is heralded by the use of quantum computing into cybersecurity designs. Fundamentally, quantum systems use entanglement and superposition to provide computational speedups that are unmatched by classical designs. This allows for the solving of intricate optimization problems that drive threat detection and anomaly identification at previously unachievable scales. In hybrid quantum-classical simulations, for example, quantum-enhanced machine learning algorithms that use variational quantum eigensolvers can process petabyte-scale network traffic datasets in almost real-time, reducing false positive rates in intrusion detection systems by up to 40% when compared to classical deep learning models. This revolutionary advantage extends to quantum key distribution protocols, which provide information-theoretic security guarantees impervious to computational eavesdropping. These protocols have the potential to secure international data exchanges with entanglement-based channels that instantly detect interception attempts, raising data integrity thresholds from probabilistic to absolute certainty in high-stakes contexts like critical infrastructure communications and financial transactions.

However, this same power also undermines the foundation of current defenses, making asymmetric encryption schemes obsolete with algorithms that can factor 2048-bit integers or solve discrete logarithms in polynomial time—tasks that would take billions of years for classical supercomputers but could be completed in a matter of hours on a fault-tolerant quantum processor with roughly 10 million logical qubits. A "harvest now, decrypt later" threat vector, in which adversaries archive encrypted intercepts today for future decryption, could compromise an estimated 20 quintillion bytes of sensitive global data repositories, ranging from healthcare records to national security archives. According to projections from leading cryptographic analyses, cryptographically relevant quantum computers may emerge within the next 8 to 12 years. According to extrapolated risk models from international cybersecurity consortia, such exposure necessitates immediate transitions to lattice-based, hash-based, and

multivariate post-quantum cryptographic standards. Migration timelines must be shortened from decades to less than five years in order to prevent systemic breaches that are expected to cause economic damages exceeding \$10 trillion annually by 2035.

The interaction between these vectors highlights the need for hybrid quantum-classical resilience solutions, in which quantum-resistant protocols coexist alongside legacy systems during staggered rollouts while quantum random number generators provide entropy pools for next-generation symmetric ciphers. Quantum vulnerability assessments must be given top priority by organizations, with at least 15–20% of yearly cybersecurity spending going into quantum-safe infrastructure, such as hardware security modules that work with NIST-approved algorithms. Additionally, international cooperation on standardization—through organizations promoting interoperable quantum networks—becomes essential to reducing fragmentation concerns and promoting ecosystems where quantum benefits are used defensively rather than offensively.

The course of cybersecurity in the quantum era ultimately depends on proactive foresight: stakeholders can navigate this computational turning point by institutionalizing rigorous threat modelling, encouraging cross-sector innovation, and incorporating ethical governance frameworks that prioritize equitable access to quantum defenses. In the face of an ever-changing danger landscape, the result will not only strengthen data protection but also redefine the sovereignty of digital domains, guaranteeing that quantum-driven innovations act as a barrier for privacy, trust, and social stability. By transforming innate dualities into a cohesive shield, this balanced stewardship protects the digital frontier for future generations.

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