In Amish Devgan v. Union of India , (2021) 1 SCC 1, the Supreme Court dealt with a television anchor’s remarks calling the Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti a “terrorist” and a “robber”, which led to FIRs in several States under Sections 153-A, 295-A and 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Court declined to quash the FIRs, issued directions on the multiple FIRs, and protected the petitioner from arrest. More importantly, it made the first sustained attempt in Indian law to define hate speech. It linked the concept to dignity, fraternity and the unity and integrity of the Nation, and it proposed a test of content, intent and harm, read in context. This comment examines the facts, the contentions and the Court’s reasoning. It argues that the framework is a welcome clarification, because it insists on mens rea and a real likelihood of harm. It also argues that the refusal to quash, the “reasonable person” standard and the treatment of influential speakers leave room for subjective application at the FIR stage. The comment concludes that the framework’s value will depend on how carefully lower courts apply it, and on whether Parliament eventually legislates on hate speech.