Indian retrenchment law developed around a specific paradigm: a firm terminates workers because it can no longer afford to employ them. This paper tests whether that paradigm remains adequate when economically viable enterprises undertake large-scale workforce reductions for reasons unconnected to financial distress, including organisational restructuring, automation and changing business models. Using doctrinal analysis of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, which came into force on 21 November 2025, the paper examines the statutory definitions of retrenchment, lay-off and closure, the threshold-based permission regime, and the newly operative Worker Re-Skilling Fund under Section 83 of the Code. It uses Oracle Corporation's 2025 to 2026 restructuring, including its reported effect on the company's Indian workforce, as an illustrative case study of downsizing by a company that was not in financial distress. The paper compares the Indian position with the European Union's collective redundancy framework, United Kingdom consultation law and German co-determination practice. It finds that Indian retrenchment law regulates the legality and financial consequences of termination with reasonable rigour but contains no mechanism distinguishing distress-driven layoffs from discretionary restructuring, imposes no disclosure obligation tied to cause, and treats consultation as largely optional outside the collective bargaining context. The Worker Re-Skilling Fund represents a genuine, if modest, legislative acknowledgment of transition costs, but it is compensatory rather than preventive and untested in practice. The paper concludes that the working hypothesis is partially supported: Indian law provides real procedural and compensatory protection but remains structured around the fact of termination rather than the reasons behind large-scale downsizing, and it proposes a calibrated set of disclosure, redeployment-consideration and reporting reforms.