India’s law requires designated independent directors to satisfy detailed eligibility conditions, disclose conflicts, undertake specified duties and sit on committees that supervise financial reporting and appointments. The assumption behind these rules is that a director who lacks disqualifying ties will be able to judge management proposals without undue influence. That assumption is incomplete. A person may comply with every statutory condition yet depend on promoters or an incumbent board for nomination, access to information, committee assignments and a second term. This article examines that dependence through the Companies Act, 2013, the SEBI listing regulations, regulatory reform papers and selected disputes. It argues that the appointment process deserves closer scrutiny than the usual catalogue of independence tests. The law now offers important counterweights, including special-resolution approval and a limited alternative involving public-shareholder support; neither makes the process wholly independent of concentrated ownership. Satyam and IL&FS show what oversight systems are asked to do when management information is unreliable, but do not prove that every independent director in those companies was culpable. A comparison with the United Kingdom and United States suggests reforms centred on nominations, independent information channels, dissent records and evidence-based accountability. The proposed standard measures independence by the director’s freedom to question, investigate and, when necessary, oppose the people who secured the appointment.